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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Desert Shield/Desert Storm
reserve recall process in the context of the past and future of the Total Force
Plan. The thesis provides an overview of the evolution of the Total Force Plan
since its inception in 1973. It then takes a case analysis approach to describing
the events of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm recall. The focus is on the systemic
obstacles faced by the implementers of the recall process. Most notably, it finds
that the focus of existing plans on mobilization rather than recall, and the
incompatibility of the reserve and active personnel information systems
complicated the recall process. It further looks at the requirements of
horizontal integration and means of engendering a more active partnership
between active and reserve components. Finally, it provides recommendations
for developing a system of graduated personnel conditions related to
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Since the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the attention of U.S.
citizens and, indeed, of the world has focused on the capability of U.S.
fighting forces. The lessening of world tensions and changing
circumstances in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during 1989 had
resulted in more than a year of euphoria, during which the possibility
of armed conflict began to seem increasingly remote. Suddenly,
circumstances changed to require the most massive deployment of U.S.
forces since the Vietnam conflict ended, this time in cooperation with
those of much of the rest of the world. This deployment occurred under a
personnel strategy known as the Total Force Plan.
The Department of Defense (DOD) adopted the Total Force Plan in
1973, concurrently with the elimination of conscription. For most of
the post-World War II era, the U.S. had relied on conscription as a
major component of personnel strategy. Adoption of the All-Volunteer
Force represented a major shift in personnel resource strategy. No
longer could DOD rely on adjustments in conscription quotas to meet
changing personnel requirements. Instead, flexibility and
responsiveness would have to come from a combination of the four
categories of personnel support which comprise the total force: active
duty forces, reserve forces, civilian fulltime employees, and civilian
contractor support.
For much of the next two decades, defense personnel requirements
were generally met by active forces, civilian employees, and civilian
contractors. Reserves played an important role through their
contributions during drill and training periods, but either national
security requirements did not demand or political conditions did not
permit deployment of reserve assets involuntarily or on a large scale.
While mechanisms were developed during this period to allow flexible
utilization of reserve assets under varying conditions, such as low-
intensity conflict and partial mobilization, skepticism that reservists
would be involuntarily activated under other than full mobilization
conditions continued to pervade DOD and the service components. Thus, a
dichotomy existed. Resource allocation between active and reserve
forces led many sophisticated planners to conclude that the employment
of reserve assets would be essential under any type of conflict
scenario. However, many of these same planners doubted that these
assets would be available except voluntarily, due to the political
ramifications of involuntary activation.
As of 1 August 1990, the mechanisms for large-scale reserve
mobilization under the Total Force Plan had been exercised on a limited
basis but never tested under real-world conditions, and many doubted
they ever would be. Then Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and, in one
week, everything changed. Defense leadership requested that President
Bush use the authority granted him under Title 10 U.S. Code 673b to
allow reserve augmentation of regular forces, and he assented.
Suddenly, the skepticism of decades had been negated, and the services
were faced with implementing, not a mobilization, but a large-scale
recall. They faced their first opportunity to dust off the on-the-
shelf-plans and test them under real-world, high-threat conditions.
There is no question that the services were able to respond to this
challenge: reservists were quickly deployed and participated actively
in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 1 To that degree, the test was
met successfully. However, a more detailed examination is in order to
determine how the test was met, what processes had to be changed, what
problems had to be solved, and how the existing systems can be changed
'Future references will be to Desert Shield, the combat portion,
Desert Storm, or the entire operation as Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
to better facilitate the process if/when it is exercised in the future.
That is the focus of this thesis.
B . OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to examine the implementation of
reserve augmentation during Desert Shield/Desert Storm in the context of
the Total Force Concept and from the viewpoint of the manpower analyst.
Specifically, the operation provided a unique opportunity to learn more
about the operation of the Total Force Concept and identify areas of
current and future concern for integration of the reserve forces. For
the first time since the adoption of the Total Force Policy in 1973,
this deployment depended, in large measure, on calling up reserve forces
to augment standing (active duty) forces. Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm represents the first time that any President has
used his authority under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 673b to call up to
200,000 reservists for two successive 90-day periods whenever he
determines they are needed. This 673b authority was changed to two
successive 180-day periods for the duration of Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, fiscal 1991 only. As the first operational test of
the Total Force Policy, this situation provides a unique opportunity to
study the efficacy of this approach in meeting national security
objectives and the workability of current systems and procedures, as
well as to identify changes that may be needed in order to enhance the
successful implementation of the policy.
The experiences with recall of reserve personnel for Desert
Shield/Desert Storm have far-reaching ramifications. These include
definition of optimal active/reserve force structure mix; alignment of
active and reserve manpower information systems; peacetime role of
reserve forces; response time under various recall and mobilization
conditions; impact of reserve integration on future operational
planning; pay issues and their impact on the cost of the total force;
Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) responsiveness to different
contingency requirements; Selected Reserve (SELRES) /gaining command
interaction in training certification; and development of procedures for
validation of reserve manpower requirements.
A significant element in the reserve recall implementation was the
difference in systemic and support requirements between implementing a
recall and mobilizing. The support systems and focus of operational
planning have tremendous impact on the accomplishment of the task
itself. The experiences of Desert Shield/Desert Storm offer an
unparalleled opportunity to hone future plans and guide future actions
based on real and recent operational experience. If the Total Force
Policy is to remain the underlying manpower strategy for force mix--and
the success of the Persian Gulf War certainly indicates that it will--
every opportunity to learn from past successes and mistakes must be
exploited to the maximum extent possible.
The gains from this are obvious. The goal of the Total Force
Policy is to achieve an optimal balance between standing and
augmentation forces. An optimal balance is one which allows achievement
of national security objectives while minimizing associated costs.
Incorrect decisions are costly, both in terms of dollars and the impact
they may have on achievement of operational missions. One of the
collateral benefits of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm is that it
provides an opportunity which surpasses that of any mobilization
exercise to assess both plans and procedures and to make the necessary
adjustments
.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question guiding this study is, "How did the
reserve augmentation process work during Desert Shield/Desert Storm?"
Subsidiary considerations addressed in support of the main goal include
the following:
- Description of the chronological evolution of reserve
augmentation for this operation
- Identification of key staff elements and their responsibilities
during this process
- Comparison of the actual process to pre-existing perceptions and
plans for accomplishing reserve augmentation
- Examination of how current systems aided or impeded the
augmentation process
- Identification of future directions and follow-on questions
resulting from lessons learned during Desert Shield/Desert Storm
and their implications for reserve planning and utilization as part
of the total force
D . SCOPE
This thesis is a case study of the reserve recall process in the
U.S. Navy from the viewpoint of the staff participants in the Washington
D.C. arena, i.e. Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) , and the staffs of
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
.
It focuses on the "macro" questions of implementation and policy faced
by manpower personnel planners and analysts at these levels. While the
"micro" questions and problems faced at the field level have major
implications for the future of the total force plan, they are included
in this study only as perceived, identified, and affecting the actions
of the first echelon staff.
There are several reasons for this limitation. First and
foremost, it is primarily as the micro questions are filtered up the
chain of command that they will have an impact on future plans and
strategy involving the Total Force Plan. Second, the scope of data-
gathering at the micro level at this time would simply be overwhelming
and would preclude completion of the study under the time constraints
identified. Finally, focus at the first echelon of command allows
better access to the underlying reasons for various problems or
decisions than does a field-level focus.
Another limitation on the scope of this study lies in the fact that
it takes the viewpoint of those focusing on the manpower/personnel
planning and processing functions. The strategic and tactical
objectives which dictate the manpower demands would be a separate and
very interesting study. This study focuses on such areas as validation
of personnel requirements, policies related to personnel reporting,
tracking and transferring of personnel data, pay questions, and related
questions. Finally, and reluctantly, this study focuses primarily on
the build-up phase of the operation, not the drawdown. 2 This is
unfortunate, since one of the more interesting and demanding phases of
the operation will be its conclusion. While plans existed for the
build-up phase, there were few, if any, guidelines for what occurs when
the crisis is over. Therefore, this is a fruitful area for research.
However, this phase has not yet been concluded; indeed, it has barely
begun. Therefore, the availability of data and the emergent nature of
the case at this time make it impossible to do more than begin to




This case study is based on two types of data: interview data and
examination of internal documents of implementation, such as decision
papers, memoranda, instructions, and letters. This type of data is used
for two reasons: First, it is the most immediate type of data available
for a situation which still in process. Second, it is particularly
well-suited to the case study approach, which depends, in large part on
describing both chronology and perceptions.
Analysis of the case study data is in the context of what the
process reveals about the management of personnel strategy and systems.
For example, in retrospect it is possible to identify what the key staff
players knew that they knew about the implementation process at the
' The term drawdown will be used in place of the more commonly-used
term "demobilization" in the interests of accuracy. Since what occurred
was a recall, and not a mobilization, and since this difference has major
personnel implications, the phase in which reservists are de-activated is
not, formally, a demobilization.
outset, what they thought they knew, what they knew without realizing
it, what they knew they didn't know, and what their blindspots were.
Identification of further information for future process planning allows
it to be incorporated into the database of future planners. The broad
context for analysis remains, as it always does in military planning
issues, the impact on mission readiness and force responsiveness. In
view of current efforts to incorporate Total Quality Leadership as the
guiding principle for Navy management, this analysis focuses on the
continuing process of improvement of existing systems, rather than on a
"right/wrong" or Gilbrethian "one best way to do work" approach.
It is important to note that the reserve augmentation process for
this operational contingency was one of involuntary recall, rather than
mobilization. This fact provided many of the challenges to implementers
throughout the duration of the operation. Despite the existence of 673b
authority, the implicit focus of both plans and systems for reserve
augmentation was mobilization. Consequently, much of what was done in
support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm involved re-thinking and
reinterpreting standing operating procedures. A further complication
was provided by the fact that personnel information systems used by
reserve and active forces were incompatible. Analysis of the events of
the first six months of this operation shows that these two factors
were, in fact, driving forces behind much of what happened.
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
In the interests of clarity and simplicity, some commonly used
terms and acronyms are defined at the outset. These include the
following:
Total Force - The Navy's total force is composed of four elements:
Active Duty, Selected Reserve, Pretrained Individual Manpower and
Civilian. 3
Selected Reserve (SELRES) - Those reservists in a drill pay status,
trained and equipped for war, who are available on a part-time,
voluntary basis during peacetime (unless recalled under appropriate
statute) . They represent the difference between the manpower the nation
can afford to maintain during peacetime (Active Duty) and the trained
manpower required at the start of a conventional war.
Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM) - These are manpower resources
which are available only at mobilization, composed of the following
three groups
:
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) - These are reservists who have
incurred a military obligation but are not in a drill pay
status
.
Standby Reserve - These are individuals who maintain their
military affiliation by choice and have skills which will be
needed at mobilization, or reservists who have been designated
as key federal employees. These reservists are not in a drill
status
Retired/Fleet Reserve - Individuals in this category have
retired from either active duty or the Naval Reserve. This
category may include personnel over the age of 60 and/or
disabled personnel, who will be called during mobilization on
an "as needed" basis only. 4
3In the early days of the Total Force Concept, a fifth element was
included, that of allied nations. As the Total Force Concept evolved into
the Total Force Policy it was recognized that U.S. planning required a
Total Force which was subject to U.S. control. Thus, while the importance
of allied burden-sharing is still a vital issue, the elements of the Total
Force, for our purposes, do not include allied support.
4 A Report on the Navy's Total Force FY 91 , DON, 1991, p. 3.
Ship Manpower Document (SMD) , Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) and
Shore Manpower Document (SHMD) - These programs use studies and analyses
to establish the quantity and quality of personnel needed to operate the
Navy's units in a wartime environment (peacetime for SHMD). 5
Navy Manpower Data Accounting System (NMDAS) - System operated by
OP-01 which consolidates inputs from resource sponsors and manpower
claimants to establish billet structuring.
Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) - This system, brought
on-line in 1983, sets mobilization requirements using data from SHMD,
SMD, and SQMD. NAMMOS is expected to provide credible, justifiable
requirements consistent with the need for readiness and minimal cost.
As Kostiuk explains:
NAMMOS is based on the idea that a particular warfighting
scenario requires a set of functions to be performed. These
functions, in turn, imply workloads that determine the quantity
of manpower needed to execute the workloads. The methodology
uses information on the relationships between peacetime
manpower and workloads to extrapolate the change in workload
upon mobilization and the resulting change in manpower
requirements. Some functions may not be expanded immediately
or the workloads may change at varying rates, so that the
manpower requirements generated are time-phased by both
quantity and quality. Although the estimates generated will be
necessarily scenario-dependent, the process can be adjusted to
reflect different wartime environments if desired. 6
Reserve Training Support System (Technical Enhancement)
(RTSS (TE)
)
- Automated personnel system used by Commander Naval Reserve
Forces (COMNAVRESFOR) echelons two through four for tracking personnel
information on reservists.
Source Data System (SDS) - Automated personnel system used for
tracking active duty service members.
5Kostiuk, Peter F., The Navy Manpower-Requirements System , CNA
Research Memorandum 87-114, p. 4.
6Kostiuk, p. 5-6.
Gain to Active Duty - Move a reservist to active duty by completing
a prescribed set of actions.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized as follows:
Chapter II: BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter presents a brief history of the reserve program and its
role under the total force concept. It focuses on the status of the
reserve program prior to the recent operation, force structure
available, and strategic planning issues identified as they relate to
the reserve program. Finally, it reviews the process used for
development of the data to be presented.
Chapter III: PRESENTATION OF THE CASE
This chapter describes what occurred, areas of responsibility,
problems encountered, and where the process is leading. Included in
this area are the development of manpower requirements and the
identification of personnel issues, as well as the context in which
events occurred.
Chapter IV: ANALYSIS/ INTERPRETATION
This chapter looks at the issues identified in the case and analyzes
their implications in light of strategic processes, readiness, and
management effectiveness. Comparison of the assumptions of pre-existing
strategy with experience will lead toward identification of future
issues of concern to the Navy's total force plans.
Chapter V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter integrates the data and analysis presented and offers
several conclusions and recommendations for future policy, strategy, and
study.
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H. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The Desert Shield build-up was evolutionary and incremental. It
represented the first test of the authority granted under Title 10 U.S.
Code, section 673(b) to call up to 200,000 SELRES for operational
reasons. Though President Bush later declared a national emergency and
broadened the augmentation under section 673 mobilization authority on
January 18, 1991, the build-up itself was conducted under 673b
authority, colloquially known as "200K" (or 200,000) authority. The
difference between requirements for recall and mobilization was
insufficiently recognized under most pre-existing plans, which
emphasized what would be done under general mobilization conditions.
There was a lack of flexible, tailored operational and personnel plans,
which meant that most of the recall had to be accomplished by people
writing new plans and programs as situations arose.
Although units could be and were recalled as units, the smaller
numbers authorized under 673 (b) and the specific requirements of this
conflict led to a more individualized recall process. The difference
meant that each individual Navy reservist recalled had to be separately
detached from the reserves and gained to active duty, a process
involving a myriad of separate tasks. This created backlogs, delays,
and vast potential for error.
Billets previously identified and validated under NAMMOS did not
provide sufficient guidance during the contingency. It was found that
theater commander requirements often identified needs in areas where the
NAMMOS system had no previously-identified requirement. Cross-
assignment occurred frequently, which has long-range implications for
planning and training.
Desert Shield/Desert Storm confounded the experts who thought
reserve assets would be used only on an "all-or-nothing" basis. Now the
planning and systemic support must catch up with the legislative
11
authority to use the Navy reserve, bringing about "One Navy" in fact as
well as in concept
.
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XI. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND METHODOLOGY
A . BACKGROUND
After abandoning conscription and adopting an all-volunteer-
force in 1973, DOD reorganized its forces around a cost-saving concept
called the Total Force Policy. This policy resulted from review of the
experiences of both World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. There are two
underlying premises of the Total Force Policy: 1) Reserve forces are
the primary augmentation element for the active force; and 2) The total
force relies on integrated use of all available forces, including
active, reserve, retired, civilian, and allied. 7
The Total Force Policy has evolved and changed as national security
objectives have altered and a cohesive U.S. maritime strategy has
emerged. The concerns were initially directed toward reducing reserve
personnel, based on the new strategy of a quick, decisive military
campaign. During the next sixteen years, improved technology and the
continuing Soviet military build up would prove that the U.S still
needed to be prepared for a protracted, conventional war, with large
ground troop mobilization. 8 This evolved into a strategy of partnership
among all elements of the total force. All too frequently, only
military personnel, active and reserve, are considered when the term
"total force" is used. In fact, much of the military force structure is
comprised of civilian employees in administrative, technical,
professional and specialized capacities. In the Navy alone, civilian
personnel are projected to comprise 19 percent of the total Naval force
89
7Total Force Policy Report to Congress, DOD, Dec 1990.
"Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, DOD, Fiscal Year 1988, p
13
as of the end of fiscal 1991. 9 Across DOD, approximately 16 percent of
the total force is composed of civilians. 10 Although the focus of this
thesis is the reserve element, all components of the total force are
interrelated and must be considered when alternatives are considered.
Both reserve components and civilians are integrated into many
theater operational plans. Since the Total Force Policy was
implemented, the reserve components have achieved unprecedented levels
of capability and readiness. 11
B. HISTORY OF RESERVE UTILIZATION
The use of reserve forces as part of warfighting strategy dates
back to the time of Prince Machiavelli. The earliest concepts of
reserve utilization differ little from those to which we subscribe
today. Originally, citizens "drilled" (underwent military training) on
holidays in their hometowns. The basic purposes behind the use of
"citizen soldiers" parallel those prevalent today: increase the number
of trained personnel available for defense without the expense of
maintaining a large, standing military force; spread the burden of
defense throughout the citizenry; avoid separation between military and
civilian members of society which comes from a two-class (professional
military and civilian) system; and minimize the potential for corruption
or expedience which comes from extensive use of mercenaries. "
United States defense objectives have never relied, for their
attainment, exclusively on a standing, professional military force. As
9A Report on the Navy' s Total Force FY 91 , Department of the Navy,
1991, p. 3.
10Total Force Policy Report , p. 23.
xlGuthrie, RADM Wallace N., Jr., Baumgardner, Captain Hugh, and
Chaloupka, CDR Mel, "The Reserve Is Ready and Waiting," Proceedings of the
U.S. Naval Institute , Sep 1990, p. 46.
i:Gilbert, Felix, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War,"
Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age , Princeton
University Press, 1986.
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noted in the 1990 Total Force Policy Report to Congress, "America has
always depended upon reserve forces and our mobilization base to
maintain, in peacetime, capabilities that would be required in war."
General George C. Marshall pointed this out at the close of World War
II:
What then must we do to remain strong and still not bankrupt
ourselves on Military expenditures to maintain a prohibitively
expensive professional Army even if one could be recruited?
President Washington answered that question in recommendations to
the first Congress to convene under the United States Constitution.
He proposed a program for the peacetime training of a citizen
Army. 13
Reserve forces have been recognized equally as essential to the
nation's seapower. In 1968, prior to the advent of the Total Force
Plan, former CNO, Admiral Thomas Moorer, stated:
For nearly two hundred years, since the days of the naval militias
of the Revolutionary War, the citizen sailors of our Naval Reserve
have been an essential element in our nation' s seapower and
military preparedness
.
The history of the Naval Reserve is one of brave men and women
whose skills, dedication and hard work over the years have enabled
our Navy and our American way of life to be what they are today.
The Navy' s tradition of victory is a heritage of which our
countrymen are justifiably proud—and one which Naval Reservists
have helped to make a reality.
The challenges which this nation faces at sea in the years to come
indicate the continued need for the most effective naval and
maritime capability. The officers and men of the United States
Naval Reserve have a significant role in contributing to the
overall strength of that capability. 14
Beginning with the eruption of World War I (WWI) , a series of
legislation, starting with the National Defense Act of 1916, created a
13 As quoted in the statement by Edward Philbin, Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 20 March 1984, Department of
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY 1985, Senate Armed
Services Committee, Part 5, Manpower and Personnel , p. 2468, found in
Cronin, Patrick M.
,
The Total Force Policy in Historical Perspective ,
Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 87-78, Jun 1987.
14Simpson, Terry L. and Ingle, Brenda D., A Financial Management
Review of the Naval Reserve Manpower Allowance and Training Requirements ,
NPS Thesis, Dec 1987, p. 18.
15
dual—purpose, federal-state status for the National Guard, and placed
both an Officers and Enlisted Reserve Corps wholly under federal
control . The Naval and Marine Corps Reserve were also created in that
same year. After WWI, the National Defense Act of 1920 was passed to
provide for an organized reserve system with acceptable military
standards. Elaborate mobilization plans replaced trained and available
manpower between the wars. Between 1920 and 1940, reservists
outnumbered active duty personnel
.
Prior to World War II (WWII) , a Joint Resolution of Congress
enacted the Selective Service Act in 1940. By June 1942, all reserve
units were mobilized to the Pacific theater. America prevailed, though
more because of its economic and industrial strength and the
perseverance of her allies than because of foresight or military
preparedness. In 1947 the National Security Act established the Air
Force as an independent service and created the Air Force Reserve and
Air National Guard.
Between WWII and Korea, reserve units had many veterans but little
money, equipment, or training. The resurrection of conscription in 1948
brought a flow of lower—ranking manpower into reserve units . The Korean
War began with 806,000 reservists activated (32 percent of 2.5 million).
The Armed Forces Act of 1952 created a system of ready, stand-by
reserves. The single most significant action affecting reservists was
the 1957 regulation requiring a minimum active duty training phase for
every reservist. This meant that every recruit would be certified at a




Apart from those conflicts already described, U.S. reservists have
seen service during a variety of international crises and some domestic
emergencies. These include, among others: the Berlin crisis (1961),
15Zuricher, Louis A., Supplementary Military Forces: Reserves,
Militias, Auxiliaries , Sage, 1978, p. 37.
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the Cuban missile crisis (1962) , the Pueblo affair (1968) , the Vietnam
conflict (1968) , the New York City area postal strike (1970) , over 260
civil disturbances, escort operations in the Arabian Gulf (Operation
Earnest Will, 1987) and the invasion of Panama (Operation Just Cause,
1989-1990) . Not all of these actions have involved involuntary recalls,




In 1970, the Total Force Concept was created by Defense Secretary
(SECDEF) Melvin Laird to make the reserves a more credible part of the
deterrent force. During the Nixon administration, the selected reserve
end-strength for all services fell from 925,000 in fiscal 1972 to
823,000 in fiscal 1976, an overall decline of 10 percent. The rationale
for cutting the reserves was linked to the then-new strategy of a quick,
decisive military campaign, rather than a long war like WWII. U.S.
military officials were pushing for a short, intensive, possibly nuclear
scenario, which precluded the need for large reserve mobilization. It
took at least five more years before the U.S. began to discuss a new
wartime strategy that was based on the ability to fight a protracted,
conventional war.
The 1980s were a decade of increasing emphasis on reserve assets.
The mid-1980s saw reserve requirements increase steadily, and the
reduction of inequities and inequalities between the active and reserve
force equipment, hardware, and training. 17 Between 1980 and 1990, Navy
SELRES end-strength increased by over 50 percent, while active duty end-
strength grew only 15 percent during the same period. Weaponry placed
in the Naval Reserve included the F/A-18, modern frigates, P-3 Update
III, and HH-60H helicopters. 18
16Total Force Policy Report
, p. 13-19,
17Cronin, op cit , 1987, p. 12.
18Navy's Total Force Fy 91
, p. 4
17
C. TOTAL FORCE PLANNING ISSUES
The major factor which must be considered in determining the size
and composition of the total force is national security objectives. In
this area, several types of issues must be considered: threat
environment, resource environment, and military strategic needs.
1 . Threat Environment
The dramatic changes which have occurred in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe since 1989 have important ramifications for U.S.
national security objectives. The current conditions in the Soviet
Union are far too chaotic for the U.S. to assume the success of the
Gorbachev reforms is assured. In fact, recent events have shown some
degree of movement back toward more repressive and restrictive policies
.
However, the changes which have already occurred have influenced the
degree of capability which the Soviet Union has of projecting force in a
conventional manner. The demise of the Warsaw Pact, while no guarantee
that the Soviet threat has ended, certainly lengthens the amount of
warning time the U.S. can assume before being forced to meet the Soviet
Union in a full—scale war
.
19
These changes led to increased scrutiny of the total force mix
and increased potential to place more forces in the reserve components,
in order to achieve cost savings while continuing to meet national
security objectives. As noted by the DOD Task Force on the Total Force
Plan, "A basic consideration in force structure decisions is the time
assumed between mobilization and combat: the longer the warning time,
the lower the required level of peacetime readiness." 20
19Cheney, Richard Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President
of the United States, Jan 1991.
:0Total Force Policy Report , p . 3
.
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Lessening of the Soviet threat does not mean a threat—free
environment. In fact, the worldwide threat level remains high. 21
However, the type of crisis which the U.S. is most likely to face has
changed: the focus is now on regional conflicts and low-intensity
conflict. These may erupt with little warning. Therefore, the U.S.
must continue to maintain rapid response capability, though the forces
in being may be smaller, due to changes in requirements as well as the
changing resource environment. 22
2 . Resource Environment
There are two main issues to be considered in the context of
the resource environment: funding and manpower,
a . Funding
The U.S. faces growing social needs, a large budget
deficit, and growing economic concerns. In real terms, the U.S. defense
budget has continually declined over the past five years, and it appears
likely that cost issues will remain important influences on force
structure decisions in the next decade. 23 In fact, it is the resource
environment which forms the driving pressure for increased reliance on
the reserve components. Former Director and Chief of the Naval Reserve,
Rear Admiral Palmer, pointed out in 1980:
Since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, defense policy
makers have embraced a Total Force policy chiefly designed to shift
missions and hardware from the active forces to reserve components.
Rooted more in domestic considerations than in strategic concepts,
the principal impetus of this policy has been to maintain




"Ibid ., p. 58.
24Statement by RADM F.F. Palmer, Director and Chief of the Naval
Reserve, 17 Jun 1980, "Hearings Before the House Appropriations Committee,
Defense Subcommittee, FY 1981, Part 10, p. 207, in Lacy, James L.,






In light of these concerns, it is important to note what
past studies have revealed about relative costs of reserve and active
components. Many of the savings associated with assignment of missions
to the reserves flow from the fact that the reserves use pretrained
individuals; thus, training costs and learning curves are minimized. As
Rishel noted:
The fact that most SELRES are veterans will be a significant factor
affecting the indirect costs of reservists as opposed to those of
active personnel ... .When large training investments are recoverable
through reserve service, the cost savings increase
dramatically. " 25
Cost savings achieved by transfer of missions or units to
the reserves differ by type of requirements. It has been demonstrated
in the past that Naval Reserve patrol (P-3) squadrons cost about 44
percent of what it costs to operate an active P—3 squadron, while Naval




Prior to announcement of the current DOD reduction in
projected end—strengths, some concern had surfaced about the future
composition of the Naval Reserve, in terms of non—prior—service
personnel. Early reports had indicated that the Naval Reserve of the
1990s might need to be manned by SAM and O-SAM personnel to a level of
50 percent . Since increased use of SAM and O-SAM personnel is
associated with escalating training and replacement costs, the actual




If the Navy, in reducing its size, is able to encourage a
high Naval Reserve affiliation rate, these concerns may be moot.
:5Rishel, Michael Paul, A Cost Comparison of Aviation Personnel
Active vs. Reserve , NFS Thesis, Dec 1985, p. 11.
;6Total Force Policy Report
, p. 27
27 Ibid., p. 45.
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However, questions of relative cost continue to dominate force mix
decisions, along with the tradeoffs they engender between cost and
readiness. Leary pointed out in 1987, "The constraints of the monies
available for defense require the United States to maximize the use of
military personnel resources, both active and reserve. As a result, the
active and reserve components of the military services must now compete
for these scarce dollars." 28
b . Manpower
The diminishing size of the youth population available for
military service during the 1990s has been of major concern to service
manpower analysts for the past decade, and continues to be an issue.
While anticipated decreases in the size of the active forces may ease
the pressure, they by no means eliminate the concern. Competition with
the private sector for the services of the most able members of the
youth population is a fact of life. The Total Force Policy Report to
the Conqre s
s
, released in December 1990, recognized this issue and
indicated that it might place additional emphasis on non—active portions
of the total force, such as civilians and reservists. However, the
impact of the Desert Shield call-up on reserve affiliation and
continuation rates has yet to be measured, and may be affected by the
actual conditions of the call-up and the implementation process itself.
One of the major manpower issues identified with reserve
force mix and utilization decisions is that of availability. Despite
the enunciation of the Total Force Policy, much of DOD leadership, and
Navy leadership in particular, remained doubtful about the availability
of reserve assets under conditions short of general war. Prior to
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, few believed that a reserve augmentation
under 673(b) was likely. Navy decisions about force structure mix were
admittedly influenced by a Concern about "limited availability of
:?Leary, Guy B., An Analysis of the United States Naval Reserve Budget
Growth , NPS Thesis, Dec 1987, p. 6.
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Selected Reserve personnel" and "reluctance to initiate a reserve call-
up." 29
These concerns were further identified in a Center for
Naval Analyses (CNA) Research Memorandum on the Total Force Policy in
1987:
The Total Force policy has marked a fundamental shift in the
composition of the armed forces because of the degree to which the
reserves have been emphasized. In short, it is increasingly
evident that there is a correlation between force manning and
readiness . The balance between active and reserve forces cannot
indefinitely continue to shift toward the reserves without
affecting the ability of the United States to respond swiftly and
with sufficient military force to crises and wars. Furthermore, it
is not clear that Congressional and Defense Department leaders have
fully considered the political and psychological implications of
having to mobilize the reserves for any large-scale contingency, or
whether the United States can count on having sufficient time to
mobilize its reserves for general war. 30
As a result of these concerns, the Navy looked on its
reserve assets as representing the difference between the active forces
the country could afford to sustain during peacetime and the trained
forces that would be needed at the outset of a conventional war. 31 The
Navy had no plans to use reservists for short—term contingency
operations. 32 During the 1987 escort operation in the Persian Gulf,
the Navy did not request an involuntary call-up of Naval Reserve
personnel assigned to minesweepers, despite the fact that minesweeping
capability was needed and nearly all of the minesweepers were maintained
in the Naval Reserve . Instead, the ships were manned with a combination
of cross-decked active duty personnel and Naval Reserve volunteers
.
In contrast, Army planning calls for substantial reserve
augmentation for all major contingency operations. The DOD Total Force
quoted in Total Force Policy Report
, p. 50
30Cronin, p. 2.
•"Navy's Total Force FY 91 , p . 3 .
?:Total Force Policy Report
, p. 49.
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Report asserted, "Since the late 1960s, Army force planners typically
have assumed that one-half of the nondivisional elements (i.e., combat,
combat support, and combat service support units) that normally support
an Army division, or about 12,500 to 15,000 personnel would be needed to
sustain that division during the first 60 days of a deployment
.
Accordingly, in 1968 the Secretary of Defense directed that at least 50
percent of each division' s nondivisional support elements should be able
to deploy immediately with the division." 33
These differences in reserve orientation may find their
explanation in the number and type of deployments each service was
accustomed to completing. The Navy, as a mobile, generally forward
deployed force, was accustomed to being the "service of choice" in a
crisis or contingency situation, and to responding with little or no
warning time. The 1991 report on the Navy's Total Force summarized,
"Since 1980, naval forces have been called to action no fewer than 50
times when our interests have been threatened overseas - in Lebanon,
Libya, the Persian Gulf, Korea, the Philippines, and in Panama, for
example." 34 The Navy's mission in peacetime is substantially closer to
its role in wartime than that of any of the other services.
Consequently, it has been the most reluctant of the services to separate
any of its missions from the active component.
Nevertheless, Navy force structure decisions of the last
decade have moved substantial mission capability to the reserve
component
. Actual percentages of mission capability which reside in the
reserve component are discussed in chapter Three
.
Committing missions and resources to the Naval Reserve was
done under the guiding principles already enumerated, namely that the
Navy would maintain, in its active component, the capability to respond
-- Ibid . , p. 48.
- 4Navy's Total Force FY 91 , p . 2
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to short-term contingencies . Skepticism about the availability of
reserve assets under other than mobilization conditions resulted in
plans which focused on using reserves only under those conditions
.
There was a dearth of planning for a reserve recall; all personnel
planning documents and personnel information systems were mobilization
oriented. 35
3 . Strategic Environment
Manpower decisions for the total force are directly related to
the strategic environment; in the Navy, they flow from the Maritime
Strategy. The Maritime Strategy is based on forward presence. Its
purpose is to use early global positioning of maritime assets to promote
deterrence and to achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails. It
emphasizes forward deployment to complicate a potential adversary'
s
planning, bolster our alliances, and deny an adversary free access to
the oceans, while maintaining and protecting the sea lines of
communication (SLOCs) essential to attainment of U.S. national security
objectives . 3S
a. Evolving Strategic Assumptions
The Maritime Strategy reflects current thinking in terms
of national strategy. On August 2, 1990, President Bush described the
evolving defense strategy and enumerated its four basic tenets: "Our
new strategy must provide the framework to guide our deliberate
reductions to no more than the forces we need to guard our enduring
interests—the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to
respond effectively to crises, to retain the national capacity to
35COMNAVRESFOR P3060.1B, Guide for the Mobilization of the Selected
Reserve
36Navy f 3 Total Force FY 91 , p. 12.
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rebuild our forces should this be needed and to maintain an effective
The Secretary of Defense clarified this evolving strategy
on September 6, 1990:
We still depend very much upon forward deployments in Asia and the
Pacific, a historic relationship with our friends in Japan and
Korea, and the deployment of forces in that part of the world, but
at lower levels. It would, obviously, continue to involve
significant U.S. deployments in Europe, but again, at significantly
lower levels as embodies in the CFE talks and reflective of the
fundamental changes under way there as well. Finally, it would
involve here at home, in the United States, the development of the
kinds of contingency forces that would allow us to back up our
strategic capability. So that concept of an Atlantic force and a
Pacific force, contingency forces based in the United States, and
strategic forces becomes the driver, if you will, of our force
structure in the years ahead. And most importantly, in terms of
sizing our active force and our reserve forces, would be to
maintain those forward deployments and to be able to reinforce in
the event of a contingency on a regional basis, keeping in mind the
notion that if we ever did have to reconstitute forces to be
prepared for global conflict, that we would have adequate warning
time to do that. 38
The major changes represented in traditional DOD thinking
by these statements are the assumption of a longer warning time to
reconstitute forces, before a protracted conventional war with the
Soviet Union would be possible, and the focus on regional conflict
instead of the Soviet Union as the primary threat. This orientation has
implications for decision regarding force structure and force mix.
The traditional concerns about the mix of active and
reserve forces and the impact of the mix were enumerated by former CNO,
Admiral James Hatkins in testimony before the Senate Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on Defense in 1987:
The Navy' s total manpower needs result directly from requirements
of the maritime strategy. . . .He have moved forward aggressively to
integrate and maximize reserve contributions while ensuring that no
missions are transferred to the reserves which either result in a
degradation of readiness, cannot be supported by available reserve
manpower, or are costlier than leaving them with the active forces.
?7Cheney, DOD Annual Report to the President and the Congress , January
1991, p. 1.
38Total Force Policy Report
, p . 59.
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The focus of this process is "horizontal integration." Front-line
ships and aircraft now compose a high percentage of the reserve
inventory. . .
.
But there are limits on our reliance on the Naval Reserve which
relate to availability during periods of crisis ... .The President's
200,000 call-up authority is insufficient to provide the Navy the
requisite augmentation in both size and type during a period short
of war. Because of this, reserve integration becomes more
difficult and must be approached with caution to ensure readiness
to meet reasonably foreseeable requirements is maintained. 39
These statements reinforce the point made earlier: Navy
force mix decisions have been heavily influenced by skepticism about the
availability of those assets to support the Maritime Strategy in periods
short of general war. This skepticism may be overcome by the events
surrounding Desert Shield/Desert Storm. This would allow the Navy to
make force mix decisions and training decisions based on a different set
of assumptions, thus focusing more on preparation for a variety of
different scenarios
.
b. Horizontal Integration and Mutual Support
The Total Force Policy has evolved, since its inception,
as a result of changes in strategic thinking and resource environment
.
Originally, the reserves were thought of exclusively as an augmentation
force, a force-in-reserve; today the reserves have come to be thought of
as a force—in—being. As Cronin observes:
Contrary to the original Total Force concept, which emphasized that
the role of the reserves was as a primary augmentation force for
active units, the Total Force policy gradually has evolved into
supporting reserve forces for first-line active missions . While it
is debatable whether or not this is desirable from a strategic
perspective, it is clearly different from what the founders of
Total Force policy intended. Both Secretaries Laird and
Schlesinger stressed in their key memoranda the augmentation role
of the reserves. Today, however, the reserves frequently are
referred to not as a force in reserve but rather as a force in
being. The problem, however, is that the reserves by their very
nature cannot be forces-in-being. They must be mobilized, which in
turn requires two critical components of any nation' s ability to
wage war: time and political will. Thus, because such an
evolution implies a much greater role for the reserves in active
'Leary, Guy B., An Analysis of the United States Naval Reserve Budget
Growth , NPS Thesis, Dec 1987, p. 6.
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missions from the start of a major national emergency, a larger
reserve forces poses some tough new questions for U.S. strategy.*
If the reserves are to be a force-in-being, their training
and their peacetime role must be examined closely, particularly in the
context of the relationship between active and reserve components. In
conflict, active and reserve forces operate together. Many feel that
preparation for interoperability can only come from horizontal
integration of the reserve and active forces during peacetime. The
meaning of horizontal integration was defined by former SECNAV John
Lehman in a posture statement in 1986:
Four years ago the Department of the Navy undertook a major
reorganization of reserve components to move from a vertical to a
horizontal relationship with the active forces. That means
essentially that the reserves must provide immediate augmentation
to the active force in time of emergency across the entire spectrum
of warfare. It means also that, in peacetime, we rely on Selected




Despite Cronin's reservations, as noted above, about the
advisability of horizontal integration, most experts see a direct
relationship between horizontal integration, training, and readiness
.
For example, as Simpson and Ingle pointed out in 1987:
One major function of the Naval Reserve in peacetime is to man,
equip and train for a high state of readiness upon mobilization.
In training to fill this requirement and ensure effective
integration upon mobilization, the Naval Reserve provides active
forces with direct support which is mutually beneficial to Selected
Reserve mobilization and training requirements. The phrase "mutual
support" has been adopted to describe those Naval Reserve training
evolutions which also provide direct assistance to active duty
units in the performance of their missions. Examples are air
logistics support for the continental U.S. (CONUS) , air tanker
services, predeployment air combat refresher training, fleet
intelligence production, fleet exercise support, ship intermediate
level maintenance, cargo handling support, construction support,





"Ibid. , p. 45.
4:Simpson and Ingle, p. 1-2
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The question of the degree of readiness which must be
required of the reserves has generated controversy. Some feel that
reserve readiness must be the same as for the active forces . This
position was spelled out by B. J. Wilson III in 1985.
The necessity of the military to respond to developing crises
necessitates that reserve forces be trained and maintained at the
same combat readiness as the active duty forces they will augment
.
As a result, the reserves must be integrated as fully as possible
in peacetime with the units they will augment in wartime. Any
delay in the integration will have a negative effect on the defense
capabilities of the United States." 43
As the threat environment has changed, and strategy has
evolved in response, thoughts on reserve readiness have also evolved.
The 1990 Total Force Policy Report points out that readiness need not be
consistent for all units, since not all units need the capability to
deploy immediately. Because a range of warning times exists, depending
on the nature of the need—short for contingencies such as Desert
Shield, longer for large—scale conflicts—a range of readiness levels
may also be possible. 44 Despite this evolution, the conclusion remains
the same : increased integration between active and reserve units is
essential
.
This integration is expected to rely in large measure on
the vigorous participation of active components in training their
associated reserve units. The 1990 Total Force Policy Report continued,
"While administration of the active and reserve components differs
markedly, the technical requirements of the mission to be fulfilled are
essentially the same. The program sponsor is, therefore, in the best
position to plan for the reserve force which will be within his
43Wilson, B. J. Ill, The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force , United
States Government Printing Office, May 1985, in Leary, Guy B., An Analysis
of the United States Naval Reserve Budget Growth , NPS Thesis, Dec 1987, p.
26-27.
"Total Force Policy Report , p. 50.
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management area when activated, to provide them with necessary
equipment, and to evaluate their readiness."
The Total Force Policy Report recommended four actions to
increase integration: active—reserve rotations; increased reliance on
hybrid units containing a mix of active and reserve personnel;
strengthened active—reserve affiliations between units which would
operate together in wartime; and increased emphasis on attracting prior-
service personnel in the reserve components.
One area of integration which the Task Force did not
address is that of systemic compatibility. The Navy, for example, has
totally different personnel information systems its for active and
reserve components, based on peacetime requirements. 45 While these
systems serve their respective components well during peacetime, they do
not facilitate integration during a recall or mobilization. 46 These
issues of integration are further examined through the actual
occurrences of the Desert Shield reserve recall
.
D . METHODOLOGY
The methodology for conducting this research relied on extensive
interviews with staff personnel involved in implementing and documenting
the Desert Shield/Desert Storm reserve augmentation process . In
addition, staff-generated documents were analyzed to identify the actual
occurrences and problem areas . The data thus generated were then
compared to pre—existing documentation described in this chapter, in an
attempt to determine points of similarity and difference. Both
interviews and documents used in conducting this analysis are identified
in the bibliography.
45Hall, Final Report of the Total Force Utilization Study , CNA, PML
Research Memo 87-82, Jul 1987.
46Matt, CAPT Michael, OP-130R, interview, March 14, 1991.
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III. THE RESERVE CALL-UP
A. THE BEGINNING
The actual start of Operation Desert Shield coincided with the
invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's forces on 2 August 1990. The
President immediately ordered U.S. military forces into Saudi Arabia and
initiated a naval blockade of Iraq to counter the threat of an Iraqi
invasion of Saudi Arabia. Soon the U.S. action was joined by other
nations and ultimately backed up by a United Nations resolution calling
for Iraq' s withdrawal from Kuwait . Reserve participation began on 22
August, when President Bush exercised the authority given the President
under Title 10 U.S. Code, section 673b. Thus began the first
application of the total force policy under actual operational
conditions
.
In order to understand the reserve augmentation process for Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, it is helpful to first provide an overview of the
milestones of the reserve call-up process. Therefore, a chronological
overview of milestones is provided:
1
. Chronology of Buildup47
Date Event
Aug 2 Iraq invades and occupies Kuwait with more than 100,000
troops
.
Aug 7 President Bush declares Saudi Arabia under imminent threat
from Iraq and order U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia.
Aug 7 U.N. Security Council imposes economic sanctions against
Iraq and calls for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait
.
Aug 10 United States prepares to deploy hospital ships UNSN
Comfort and USNS Mercy to southwest Asia;
47Chronology of events through 1 December 1991 from Downey, Robert W.,
Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Participation in Operation Desert Shield (As
of 15 January 1991) , Center for Naval Analyses, January 1991, p. 4-6.
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Joint Chiefs of Staff consider reserve recall to provide
support to the Desert Shield operation.
Aug 17 SECDEF asks military departments and JCS to prepare plan
for call-up of reserves
.
Aug 22 President Bush authorizes the call-up of selected reserves
under the authority of Title 10 U.S. Code, section 673b
and notifies Congress of the call-up.
Aug 23 SECDEF directs the involuntary call-up of selected reserve
(SELRES) units and individuals to active duty. Service-
specific call-up ceilings are issued. The Navy ceiling is
6,300 and the Marine Corps ceiling is 3,000.
Aug 24 Initial elements of Navy reserves called, including 2,400
medical personnel to backfill CONUS hospitals for staffs
ordered to hospital ships and other deployed units. Also
called were 800 personnel Kith Military Sealift Command
(MSC) units, mobile inshore underwater warfare (MIUS)
teams, and ocean minesweeper (MSO) crews.
Sept 6 Additional Navy reserves in cargo handling and combat
helicopter search and rescue (SAP.) units slated for
recall
.
Sept 13 Navy control of shipping (NCS) , intelligence and logistics
support units and personnel are added to call—up plan.
Oct 10 Marines order activation of first unit from reserves—
a
combat service support detachment (CSSD) to replace an
active unit deployed to the Persian Gulf
.
Oct 29 The call—up period of active-duty service for combat
reserves is extended from 90 days/180 days to 180 days/360
days (specifically for operation Desert Shield during FY
1991 by provision of the Defense Appropriations Act for FY
1991.
Nov 8 President Bush orders more than 150,000 additional troops
to the Persian Gulf.
Nov 9 SECDEF announces the end of plans for rotation of troops
assigned to the Persian Gulf. Troops in—theater will
remain for duration of operation.
Nov 13 Reserve call up authority increased to 126,250 by SECDEF.
Navy ceiling is 10,000; Marine Corps ceiling is 15,000.
Nov 30 Army activates its first combat units.
Dec 1 SECDEF increases recall authority to 189,250. Navy
ceiling is increased to 30,000 and Marine Corps to 23,000.
Jan 16 Coalition air offensive begins.
Jan 18 President Bush issues executive order authorizing the
ordering of the ready reserve to active duty under Title
10 U.S. Code section 673.
31
Jan 19 Reservists ordered to active duty under 673b have their
status altered and are placed on active duty under 673
.
Recall ceiling is increased to 360,000 Ready Reserves.
Feb 23 Ground offensive begins
.
Feb 27 President Bush orders ground offensive suspended.
2 . Composition of the Navy' s Total Force
Understanding of the Total Force Plan implementation requires,
as background, some familiarity with the overall end-strength of that
force and the relative contributions of the various components. Figure
3-1 shows the various elements of the total force and their relative
percentages. This figure is based on fiscal 1991 projections, and
comprises a total of 1,682,400 personnel. Note that 45 percent of the
total force is comprised of SELRES and personnel in the three PIM
categories . This means that nearly half of the total force requires
specific Presidential or Congressional action in order to be available
during a crisis
.
Total Reserve manpower available at the outset of Desert Shield
(as of 31 July 1990) is shown in Figure 3—2. All categories of Navy
Reserve personnel—Ready, Standby and Retired—combined provided a total
pool of nearly 425,000. This figure shows the relative size of each
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FIGURE 3-1 Total Force Composition
3 . Procedures for Call—up
a. Recall and Validation of Requirements
Accessibility of reserve personnel is a complex issue.
Table 3—1 shows the various statutory options available under which
reservists may be involuntarily recalled. Most of these require either
a declaration of war or national emergency. The major exception is 10
USC 673b, which allows calling up to 200,000 SELRES for operational
requirements. This was passed in 1976 and tested for the first time
during Desert Shield. Even these somewhat understate the issue, since
domestic and international politics also play a significant role . For
example, a reserve recall is a strong signal to the international
community of U.S. resolve. Depending on the size of the recall and the
world political climate, this may be either reassuring or alarming.
Once the decision is made to recall, requirements must be



























































Total 8,064 Total 306,78
1
Officer
Total 71.306 Total 237.475
Enlisted
U S. Navy Rasorva resources aa of 31 July 1990
Source: Navy Total Force Report, Fy 91
FIGURE 3-2 Reserve Strength
for a Persian Gulf conflict "provided the basis for the initial Navy
estimates of the reserve requirements for Desert Shield." 48 These were
subject to SECDEF guidance regarding the Desert Shield call-up. The
initial SECDEF guidance included the following four considerations :
48Downey, Robert w. Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Participation in
Operation Desert Shield (As of 15 January 1991) , Center for Naval Analyses
141, January 1991, p. 15.
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Table 3-1 RECALL AUTHORITIES
LAN INVOKED BY PURPOSE APPLICABILITY
10 USC 673 PRESIDENT NATIONAL
EMERGENCY
READY RESERVE


















10 USC 6489*2 PRESIDENT NATIONAL
EMERGENCY
FLEET RESERVE








- It would be based only on the projected needs for Desert Shield.
— It would be based on the current force structure and would not
provide support for other possible contingencies
.
- It would not include Army Reserve or Coast Guard combat units.
— It would be governed by application of the 90—day limitation on a
unit-by-unit basis, rather than being measured from the initial
call—up of reserves.
After review of the contingency plans, SELRES requirements
were developed by requesting updated deployment requirements from the
theater Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) . These, in turn, were provided by
the service operational elements reporting to the CINCs, the Fleet and
Type Commanders, in the Navy's case. The Naval Military Personnel
Command, along with the reserve command, calculated current onboard
manning and projected manning for two, four and nine months into the
future. These force projections were compared to status of currently
35






Figure 3—3 Recall Process
Source: OP—095 briefing
deployed units and units scheduled for deployment in December 1990 and
the second quarter of fiscal 1991, as well as those not scheduled for
deployment until later in 1991. Manning level projections compared to
authorized billets determined critical shortfalls. Manning of 100
percent of billets authorized, which is not generally maintained during
peacetime deployments, was required to ensure a high level of readiness
throughout the fleet.*9
49CDR Davilli, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Manpower, information paper, January 1991.
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The activation process used by the Navy is summarized in
figure 3-4, provided by the CNO staff (OPNAV) , code OP-095, Director of
the Naval Reserve. As it shows, after validated requirements were
received by CNO they were forwarded to OP-601, Mobilization Policy,
which coordinated with OP-095, the Deputy CNO, and OP-01, Personnel, as
well as COMNAVRESFOR . After this coordination had been effected, the
actual call-up process was initiated. Throughout the operation, the
Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) was responsible for keeping Congress
informed of call—up actions
.
Identification of manpower requirements under a
mobilization scenario is guided by the NAMMOS system, which contains
validated mobilization billets derived from the data in the SMD, SQMD
and SHMD . However, Desert Shield was a recall of individuals, rather
than a mobilization. Therefore, NAMMOS, which focuses on units rather
than individuals, could be used only as a general guide and was somewhat
less helpful than it would have been in the mobilization it was designed
to support
.
The first recall increment contained authorization for the
Navy and Marine Corps to call 6,300 and 3,000 people respectively. This
was increased in November to 10,000 for the Department of Navy (DON),
and subsequently to 30,000 and then to 44,000 each, USNR and USMCR. 50
It should be noted that the SECDEF establishes a ceiling for the number
of reservists who may be called by each service. It is then up to the
service chiefs to determine how much of their total authorized number
they will actually call
.
b. Processing Recalled Reservists
(1) Mobilization vs. Recall. The primary difference
between a recall and a mobilization is that a mobilization allows
personnel to be processed as units, thus simplifying and streamlining
'Downey, p. 4-6.
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the administrative procedures involved. The large-scale involuntary
recall invoked in Desert Shield/Desert Storm was unprecedented. With
few exceptions, reservists had to be processed as individuals, each with
his or her own set of orders and all of the accompanying paperwork. The
complexity of this process is well described in Appendix
A, COMNAVRESFOR Memorandum for NAVRESFOR Activities, ADMINISTRATIVE
POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR VOLUNTARY/INVOLUNTARY RECALL TO ACTIVE DUTY.
Once a manpower requirement was validated and the
individual to fill it was identified, the person was required to report
to either the Naval Reserve Activity (NRA) or the local Personnel
Support Detachment (PSD) for processing to active duty. Each reservist
required an individual set of orders, as well as transportation
arrangements to the ultimate duty station. Each reservist required an
individual W-4 for federal income tax, a DD 205B for state income tax,
and enrollment in the Direct Deposit System (DDS) . Each service record
had to be individually verified for date of service (DOS) and obligated
service (OBLISERV) . The service record entry for history of assignments
(NP1070/609) had to be individually updated for each activated
reservist. Individual applications for Dependent Identification Cards
( (DD Form 1172) had to be completed, and families processed for access
to military medical care. Risk factor screening/physical readiness test
results (OPNAV 6110/2) had to be obtained and filed in each service
record. These actions represent only the tip of the iceberg of the
actions necessary to transfer a reservist to active
status
.
A major factor in the processing operation was the
incompatibility of the various information systems involved. Reservists
are carried in the RTSS; active duty members in SDS . In order to gain a
reservist to active duty, the individual had to be detached from SELRJES
and gained under the SDS system. However, lack of communication
capability between RTSS and SDS required that each transaction be
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handled manually at the outset of the operation. A further complication
was that the RTSS system extended only to echelon four of the reserve
command. At echelon five a different system, RSTARS, is in effect.
This system also lacked capability to communicate with RTSS . Since
RSTARS is a batch processing system and not linked to RTSS, timing of
updates regarding individuals filling billets did not always match.
This resulted in some discrepancies between individuals requested for
active duty, based on their qualifications, and those who actually
received orders
.
The lack of match-up between RTSS and RSTARS also
became evident in the notification of gaining commands . The Logistic
Support Mobilization Plan (LSMP) calls for the Reserve Center to notify
the gaining command of a reservist's arrival. During Desert
Shield/Desert Storm this function was assumed by COMNAVRESFOR . On some
occasions, COMNAVRESFOR would notify a gaining command of the assignment
of a particular number of reservists, based on information available in
the RTSS of assignment and Reserve Billet Sequence Code (RBSC)
.
However, COMNAVRESFOR, which did not have access to RSTARS, might not
know that some percentage of those reservists would fall under various
deferment categories and, therefore, would not deploy. In this case, a
gaining command might be notified by COMNAVRESFOR to expect ten
reservists, and only six would actually arrive. 51
The situation was particularly complex with regard to
ship augmentation personnel. In some cases, afloat Commanding officers
(COs) were able to cross-deck qualified active personnel from ashore or
other afloat commands . Rarely would the Reserve command structure be
aware that some of the billets they were ostensibly trying to fill had
been filled with active personnel . Upon receipt of a message to expect
a given number of reservists, ships were sometimes faced with a lack of
51 Bishop, Debbie, COMNAVRESFOR Code 4, Mobilization Analyst,
interview, 13 May 1991.
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bunks for incoming personnel. In these cases, it was necessary to
cancel or reassign the activated reservists. Afloat commands also posed
a special challenge with regard to Point of Embarkation (POE) . With
personnel generally moving as individuals rather than as units,
transportation arrangements were difficult in any event; the necessity
of hitting a moving target simply exacerbated the situation.
(2) Process Chronology. A different look at the
chronology of the reserve augmentation for Desert Shield is provided in
Table 3-2 . This summary looks at the recall from a reserve policy
standpoint, identifying the milestone dates for key policy
decisions/actions. This table shows the incremental nature of the
buildup in the context of policy decisions. For example, the initial
CNO message on reserve activation specified a 24-hour report time. This
was extended to five days early in January, and to ten days by the end
of January, as difficulties arose for reservists in adjusting personal
affairs. This necessity points to an area which should be closely
examined in development of future plans : the warning time required for
reservists to be activated, and the impact of this warning time on
readiness and force mix decisions . Information in this table was
provided by the Naval War College, which has developed an extensive
timeline of all events related to reserve augmentation for Desert
Shield/Desert Storm.
B. MISSIONS OF NAVY RESERVES EMPLOYED IN DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM
1
. Conceptual Strategy of Force Mix
The role of reservists differs in the air and ground strategies
of warfighting, which is reflected in the reserve force strategies of
the different services. The Army, in particular, organizes reservists
into commissioned, or self-sustaining, units. Under present maritime
strategy, the Navy focuses on using reservists as augmenters of existing
commands, concentrating on using reservists to backfill those billets
vacated by active personnel transferred to combatant operations, as well
40
TABLE 3-2 PROCESS CHRONOLOGY
MEMO/MESSAGE SUBJECT POLICY





































CNO 040008Z JAN 91 Reserve recall Extends report
time to 5 days




CNO 240012Z JAN 91 Reserve recall Extends report
time to 10 days






















Source : Naval War Co liege, CDR Mel Chalouf>ka
as to augment Coast Guard (which also transfers to the Navy in time of
war) efforts in protecting U.S. coastal waters. During the current
mobilization, a large number of the Navy reservists activated were
Medical Corps and Medical Service Corps personnel. Other reservists
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reported to their gaining commands, deployed at sea or stationed ashore,
to increase the unit manning to 100 percent and fulfill emerging
requirements related to the crisis.
2 . Reserve Missions and Force Structure Mix
The Navy's Report on the Total Force FY 91
, p. 3, points out,
"The goal of Navy' s Total Force policy is to completely integrate the
two most combat-ready elements - the Active Duty and SELRES forces -
into an operational arm prepared for immediate employment, supported by
the Civilian element and augmented, at mobilization, by personnel in the
PIM. " Since it is impossible to predict with 100 percent accuracy which
mission elements will be needed in a particular contingency, transfer of
missions between active and reserve components is a complex task, tied
as closely as possible to the National Threat Scenario, but influenced
as much or more by political and financial concerns. In fact, the Total
Force Utilization Study found that, "Economic and political
considerations drove the development of the total force. Strategic 1
considerations played at best a minor role." 52
Table 3-3 shows the major Naval Reserve mission areas as a
percentage of the Navy's total capability (as of fiscal 1989) . " This
reflects the force mix decisions which have been made since the
inception of the Total Force Plan. Those missions which appear most
specifically related to combat-only environments have the heaviest
concentration in the reserve component, such as light attack helicopter
squadrons. Those requirements which must be met during peacetime as
well as in war have lesser concentrations of capabilities residing in
the reserves. Some areas, such as medical and intelligence, routinely
integrate their reserve assets into peacetime operations, both during
weekend drills and annual training.
5:Hall, John v., Final Report Of the Total Force Utilization Study
,
CNA Research Memorandum 87-82, July 1987, p. 1.
S -A Report On the Navy's Total Force FY 91 , p . 4
.
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TABLE 3-3 MAJOR NAVAL RESERVE MISSION AREAS AND PERCENTAGE OF NAVY'
S
TOTAL MISSION CAPABILITY, FISCAL 1989
MISSION AREA PERCENT OF CAPABILITY
Logistic Airlift Squadrons (CONUS) 100
Fighter/Composite Squadrons (CONUS 100
Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons 100
Strike Rescue/Special Warfare 100
Inshore Undersea Warfare Units 100
Naval Control of Shipping 99
Cargo Handling Battalions 93
Military Sealift Command 85
Mine Warfare Ships 82
Mobile Construction Battalions 68
Special Boat Forces 57
Fleet Hospitals 53
Maritime Patrol Squadrons 35
Intelligence/Security Group 35
Medical Support Personnel 34
LAMPS ASW Squadrons 33
HELO MCM Squadrons 25
Frigates (FFG-7/FF-1052) 24
EOD Mobile Units 24
Carrier Air Wings 14
Source : Report on the Navy' s Total Force FY 91
Table 3—4 summarizes the Desert Storm recall as of 14 March
1991, providing a basis for comparison with the reserve mission areas
shown above . It should be noted that the Desert Shield/Desert Storm
recall included reservists from virtually all mission areas. However,
the mission areas which were most heavily represented were medical,
sealift, logistics, service—support, and intelligence. 54
The initial phase of the call—up focused particularly on
medical personnel. As Downey points out, "These were primarily the
medical staffs called to backfill CONUS hospital vacancies that resulted
from the deployment of active duty members to staff the hospital ships
and fleet hospitals." 55 This philosophy represented a departure from
"Downey, Robert W., Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Participation in
Operation Desert Shield (As of 15 January 1991), January 1991, p. 2 .
55Downey, p. 8
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TABLE 3-4 MARCH RECALL STATUS REPORT
RECALL SUMMARY a/o 14 MAR 91














































Source: Unpublished information paper, SECNAV DASN for Manpower
earlier thinking, when hospital ships had designated SELRES units
.
These units were eliminated in favor of drawing active personnel to
staff hospital ships, backfilling with reservists. One difficulty which
emanated from this approach is that hospital ships require non—medical
personnel who are not normally associated with hospital units. While
non-medical personnel from other areas were designated to man these
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ships when they got underway, the personnel filling these billets had
been assigned to other tasks in the interim, tasks which did not have
reservists identified as backfill. Aviation personnel to man the
hospital ship' s flight deck are a good example of the type of shortage
caused by this approach. Cross-assignment of personnel from other units
was required in order to meet this need. 56
In addition to medical requirements, Navy reserve augmentation
requirements in the early stages of the operation were strongly tied to
support for force deployment, sealift and shipping, and intelligence and
security.
Differences between planning estimates of reserve requirements,
recall ceilings authorized by CNO, and actual numbers recalled were
shown in Table 3—4, previously introduced. As it shows, although a few
communities recalled more than the number listed under CNO
authorizations, the number who actually reported aboard—the critical
figure when dealing with authorizations—was less in each case . In most
cases, planning figures and CNO authorizations were quite close.
Numbers actually recalled showed a greater degree of disparity.
The most significant differences were seen in the area of
ship's augmentation personnel. Although 12,700 were called for in
planning estimates, this was reduced to 6,500 for authorized ceilings.
This figure, in turn, was reduced still further, to 1,838 for number
recalled, of whom about two—thirds actually had reported aboard by 14




As described, the recall process was highly complex, involving a
large number of issues which had not previously been covered in existing
plans. Each required study, resolution, and promulgation of policy
6Parke, CDR Tom, OP-095, interview, 13 May 1991
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One of the major areas claiming attention was that of
compensation. Specifically, entitlement to permanent change of station
(PCS) allowances, such as household goods movement, had to be addressed,
given the length of time covered by the individual's orders.
Ultimately, the decision was made that per diem would be authorized for
reservists and that they would not be entitled to PCS allowances.
Personnel recalled for Desert Shield and their pay records fell
into one of three categories, all of which required slightly different
handling:
(1) SELRES assigned to INCONUS active duty command with SELRES
records maintained by the local Personnel Support Detachment (PSD)
.
(2) SELRES assigned to OUTCONUS host command with SELRES
record maintained by overseas PSD/personnel office servicing host
command
.
(3) SELRES assigned to OUTCONUS host command with SELRES
record maintained by INCONUS PSD
.
All SELRES personnel were designated to be ultimately separated
from active duty INCONUS . The specific procedures varied with their
category of assignment, as described above. While these procedures were
not grossly different, developing responsive procedures and ensuring





Identifying the conditions under which a recalled reservist
could be excused or deferred from serving was a major area of concern.
This involved two sets of questions: those related to changes in status
and those related to personal deferment
.
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Changes in status included requests for transfer between units,
change from SELRES to IRR status, requests for retirements, and release
from active duty due to end of service obligation. In some cases,
reservists had the option to reenlist, extend, or be discharged at the
end of their obligation. If they lacked sufficient obligated service,
most could not be deployed, although some stop-loss provisions applied.
Reserve activity Cos had the authority to approve transfers between pay
units, and could not delegate this authority.
A number of actions were taken by the Navy to accommodate
personal problems which could have affected deployability . While early
messages directed reporting of recalled personnel within 24 hours,
reporting time was later extended to five days and, still later, to ten
days. This was to support the reservists in arranging their personal
affairs
.
Various categories were identified for deferment . They
included medical, school, judicial, and personal. Medical reasons for
deferment included hospitalization, convalescence, evaluation for
retention, positive HIV test, or pregnancy. Reservists under the age of
20 who were still in high school and those who had not completed their
basic training were exempted for school. College students, ROTC
members, and students in professional curricula were activated with
their units, unless their contracts stipulated that activation was
precluded. Physicians and nurses in training in critical areas were
also exempted.
Relatively few personal reasons for deferment were acceptable
except on a case-by-case basis . Navy guidance specified that those with
military spouses or sole parents were to be activated. Sole surviving
sons and daughters were to be activated but not deployed unless they
volunteered. Procedures were established for individuals to be exempted
due to extreme personal hardship. These cases were reviewed by
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COMNAVRESFOR and decided by the SECNAV. Financial hardship and
essentiality of civilian occupation were specifically excluded.
3 . Administrative and Processing Procedures
In addition to the categorization differences above, the
administrative processing of reservists raised numerous questions, which
had to be addressed by the staff responsible for implementing the
recall . A few of these are responsibility for approving transfer
between pay billets, processing of retirement requests, updating
dependent care plans, processing differences required for those who
voluntarily returned to active duty as opposed to those involuntarily
recalled, guidance procedures for personnel evaluations for recalled
reservists, authorization to sell unused accrued leave.
D. SUMMARY
The reserve recall process was a massive undertaking. This first
use of the Presidential reserve augmentation authority under 673b
presented many first—time issues, which required rapid assessment and
resolution, allowing little time to determine the long—term
ramifications and precedents which were set by the process. The lack of
pre-existing plans for this eventuality directly affected the





A. ISSUE ANALYSIS IN CONTEXT
The issues which developed in the Desert Shield/Desert Storm
reserve recall process can be analyzed most effectively in the context
of previous experience . Both real world and exercise experience provide
a basis for comparison with the process during this contingency
operation. However, recent, real—world recall experience was
conspicuously absent. The "200K" authority under 673b was enacted in
1976, and had not, previously, been exercised. The most recent
contingency-related Navy Reserve recall occurred in 1968, in support of
the Pueblo crisis. Beyond that, most relevant experience comes from
exercises, though exercise experience is also severely limited.
1 . Pueblo Experience
At first glance, the experience associated with the Pueblo
recall might appear too remote and limited to be of value in analysis of
current experience. In that era, before the All Volunteer Force and the
Total Force Plan were conceived, the assumptions associated with use of
Reserve Forces were entirely different . Since the inception of the
Total Force Plan, reserve readiness has reached an all time high, as
noted earlier. Equipment has been upgraded. The reserve force today is
very different than the Naval Reserve of 1968. In addition, the Pueblo
recall was small, in comparison with Desert Shield/Desert Storm; the six
squadrons recalled were quietly released from active duty six months
later without ever having left CONUS . With all of these differences,
how could one find a parallel between this event and Desert Shield?
One finds it in the post—recall lessons—learned analysis
.
After the Pueblo recall, two major problem areas were cited:
difficulties in enacting a recall as compared to a mobilization and lack
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of congruity between reserve and active systems
.
57 Twenty-three years
later, these same issues were to haunt the implementers of the Desert
Shield recall, despite all the changes in assumptions, intentions, and
capabilities which occurred in the interim.
2 . Exercise Experience
Focus on reserve integration into conflict scenarios has been
growing through the years since the inception of the Total Force Plan.
In July 1989, enhanced reserve play58 was incorporated into a major war
game for the first time with its inclusion in Global War Game (GWG) 89.
The opportunity was valuable but the picture was not encouraging. 59
The GWG series of exercises has "had a significant impact on
the nation's approach to global conflict and national strategy." 60 The
decision to enhance reserve play in this exercise is indicative of
concerns and influential thinking among defense and government
leadership. In 1989, GWG provided a picture of multiple crises and
regional conflicts, set in 1995. As a result of the multiple fronts
involved, active forces became overextended and force expansion became a
necessity. Recall of reservists became a critical option as well as a
means of signalling national will and commitment
.
a. Global War Game 89 Results
The pivotal question is, "What happened?" Guthrie et al
.
identify three major learning points. 61
The first issue to emerge was that existing operational
plans and prescribed force lists were not sufficiently flexible. They
Guthrie et al., "The Reserve Is Ready and Waiting," Proceedings
,
September 1990, p. 50.
58The terms "play" and "players" are commonly used to refer to the
process and participants in wargames.
59Guthrie et al., p. 50.
60 Ibid, p. 50.
"Guthrie et al . , "The Reserve is Ready and Waiting," Proceedings ,
September 1990.
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did not provide exercise players with workable guidelines to follow in
enacting a reserve augmentation. The lack of incorporation of reserve
planning into global war scenarios, as well as lack of experience with
real world recalls left players at a disadvantage . They did not have
the resources and solutions at their fingertips which were necessary in
this case. Thus, they were forced to invent entirely new approaches to
solving the problems presented as the scenario developed.
Second, many players had a misconception of the role of
673b, or "200k" authority, in the augmentation process, regarding it as
the first step in a mobilization under conditions of national emergency,
rather than the discretionary Presidential recall it really is . There
was a tendency to respond inflexibly to implementation of the 200K
authority by expanding automatically to the full 200, 000—reservist
ceiling authorized, rather than tailoring the recall to the individual
requirements of a specific mission. As Guthrie et al, point out,
"Flexibility suffered from undue reliance on ' scripted' forces outlined
in the joint planning guidance .
"
The third point is related to the second. Experience
during GWG 89 indicated a tendency for each service to immediately
exercise recall authority to its full—share ceiling, in order to prevent
portions from being reassigned to other services . The effect was to
reduce joint staff reapportionment flexibility, as well as to risk
sending unintended signals to the U.S. and the rest of the world. 62
The second and third points were also observed during
PACEX 89, a combined Command Post and Field Training exercise which
occurred immediately after GWG 89, during August and September 1989.
This was also a joint exercise which took place throughout the Pacific
area of responsibility, and was the largest mobilization of forces in
the Pacific since World War II . Both the tendency to regard 673b as a
62 Ibid, p. 50.
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short stop on the road to full 673 implementation, and the tendency to
immediately recall to ceiling authorizations rather than respond to
specific requirements were noted by participants."
On balance, the learning experiences represented here
pointed out the need for more flexible plans and selective, tailored
utilization of reserve assets to meet specific requirements.
b. Comparison of GHG 89 Experience with Desert Shield/Desert
Storm
The Desert Shield/Desert Storm reserve recall, as
described in the previous chapter, was an incremental, evolutionary
process. It is apparent, therefore, that at least one of the lessons
learned above had been taken to heart and a potential problem averted:
immediate recall to ceiling authorization levels, regardless of
validated manpower requirements and specific scenario—dependent needs.
However, not surprisingly, given the short amount of time
which had passed since the exercise was conducted, the basic problem
remained: existing plans and force lists, coupled with prior experience
did not provide sufficient flexibility and forced key staff members to
develop new ways to solve problems virtually overnight. In this area,
the real-world test validated the concerns of the exercise
.
3 . Human Cost of Accomplishing the Mission
The cost of accomplishing the mission was high, due to the lack
of adequate, flexible, requirement-driven plans. Incorporating the
matching of sailors and requirements needed was difficult and resulted
in high labor intensity and large potential for error.
Navy scenarios had become dependent on unit mobilization
instead of individual recall. To match billets with sailors, systems
had to be adapted, and, in many cases, new and complex programs had to
"Author's personal experience as Exercise Fleet Counterintelligence
Officer for CINCPACFLT during much of PACEX 89
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be written before requirements could be met. This was both manpower-
intensive and untimely. 64
Because each recall had to be accomplished individually, the
functional requirements of Desert Shield far exceeded day—to-day system
capabilities, creating a backlog. Moreover, the individualization was
manual—input driven, vastly increasing the potential for errors; and
errors occurred in various areas, most notably pay, as a result. For
example, a recalled Senior Chief Petty Officer's grade was mistakenly
changed to that of a Third Class Petty Officer. Naturally, this
occupied quite a bit of his attention until the problem was
corrected. 65
Another example is that of a recalled lieutenant commander who
was first assigned to Military Sealift Command headquarters and later
sent to the Persian Gulf . For some reason, the form requesting direct
deposit of pay, required of each recalled reservist, had not been
received by Navy Finance Center, nor had the endorsement to his orders.
It took the intervention of CNO staff before his wife was finally able
to receive an allotment check the second week of February.
Incidents of this type can cause major morale problems for the
individuals and their families, and may have widespread impact on others
who hear of them, affecting the perception of a Navy which does nor does
not "take care of its own." Many of the reservists who were recalled
were already experiencing significant reductions in their income through
leaving their civilian jobs and returning to military compensation.
Adding difficulties with receiving their full pay and allowances to this
equation risks creating long—term disillusionment . This conceivably
"From a briefing provided by OP-130R.
65Skeen, David R., OP-16, "Resolution of Navy Personnel Information
Deficiencies," (Briefing), 8 Feb 91.
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could have a greater impact on continuation rates in SELRES than the
inconveniences and hardships of the recall itself.
Morale is not the only area which suffers when this type of
difficulty is widespread. Wise and conscientious Cos have long
practiced the principle that people are their first concern, and paying
their people is a major priority. The CO at a major Navy support base
for Desert Storm reported problems ensuring that recalled Reserves had
accurate, updated personnel records which supported their active duty
benefits, as well as problems ensuring that reservists were paid
properly. He focused a great deal of concentration on getting the
problem solved, taking time from war planning, billeting, and logistic
transport requirements which were also under his domain.
B. RAMIFICATIONS FOR TOTAL FORCE PLANNING
1 . Threat Environment and Evolving U.S. Strategy
As noted in chapter II, the threat environment has changed
significantly, which affects the future of total force planning. The
significance of the President's decision to use 673(b) authority during
Desert Shield/Desert Storm cannot be over—emphasized, particularly in
light of the changing threat environment . This decision sets a
precedent, and addresses the long-standing concern felt by Navy
leadership that reserve assets would be unavailable in a crisis. Though
this concern is not totally eliminated by one operation, the support
generated during Desert Shield/Desert Storm for reserve utilization
further emphasizes the necessity of realistic planning for incorporating
reserve assets into contingency planning.
The need for this planning is one of the major lessons learned
from the operation. The lack of systemic support and existing
implementation plans to support a recall of this size was one of the
major obstacles faced by Navy implementers . Since no two contingencies
are ever exactly alike, a graduated system of personnel conditions, with
accompanying implementation plans, would be needed to guide future
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implementations. One of the major contributions such planning could
make would be to identify the questions that need to be asked at the
outset. This is far preferable to an ad hoc reaction to questions as
they arise.
The changing threat environment has necessitated modifying
planning in many arenas . Although this means that planners are fully
tasked, it also means that the time is ripe for adding a greater degree
of sophistication to manpower planning for incorporation of reserve
assets. This also promotes another look at force-mix decisions. As
U.S. strategy focuses more strongly on regional conflict scenarios, the
role of reserves in regional and low—intensity conflict will call for
more attention from operational and personnel planners.
As noted in chapter II, other services, in particular the Army,
have previously made force mix decisions which committed them to using
reserve assets in any conflict scenario. Their dependence on these
assets is reflected in the systemic support which they have provided to
reserve integration. These systems need to be examined by Navy manpower
analysts and mobilization staff, to see if they can be incorporated into
future Navy planning.
2 . Resource Environment
Cost is a major pressure driving the shift of assets to the
reserve components. The general indication is that reserve forces are
less costly than active forces . This differs by type of unit and type
of manning, and specific cost questions are outside the scope of this
analysis. However, one issue which emerged from the Desert
Shield/Desert Storm operation has clear resource implications : systemic
support for integrating active and reserve information systems. The
lack of congruity and interface between SDS, RTSS, and RSTARS
necessitated individual handling and "band-aid" solutions. Ultimately,
if "One Navy" is to be more than just an ideal, the systems must be
integrated in ways which support both peacetime and contingency
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requirements. This will not be cost-free, but it is essential to
professional handling of reserve recalls in the future
.
3 . Manpower Requirements
Planning concerns and resource concerns come together in
identification and validation of manpower requirements . Initially,
enthusiasm for the NAMMOS system was high. It was a definite step in
the direction of systematizing mobilization requirements. As Cronin
points out
:
NAMMOS lived up to its original expectations. For the first time,
the Navy had a means of systematically assessing manpower
requirements for mobilization, related to a specific scenario, and
identifying which billets should be held by selected reservists .**
However, NAMMOS proved to be so exclusively oriented to
mobilization, as opposed to partial mobilization or recall, that its
deficiencies were highlighted by the Desert Shield/Desert Storm
experience . The differences between planning estimates of recall
requirements and actual recalls effected indicate that billets need to
be re—examined and assets aligned with the needs they are most likely to
be required to fulfill . Training can then be tailored to ensure maximum
readiness
.
One key to this area is involvement of gaining commands in the
development and validation of manpower requirements . Personnel in OP-
601 indicated that the gaining commands were the key element in
identifying manpower requirements for the operation. Commands with
active, pre-existing, horizontally-integrated relationships with their
augmentation units had a definite advantage in the early days of the
recall
.
They were more familiar with the capabilities of their
reservists, the needs they could meet, and the actions required to bring
them on board. Desert Shield/Desert Storm re—confirmed and re-
emphasized the need for horizontal integration to become a reality.
"Cronin, Patrick, The Total Force Policy in Historical Perspective ,
CNA Research Memorandum 87-78, p. 35.
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4 . Training
Horizontal integration is also a key factor in training. The
partnership needs to be dynamic on both sides, reserve and active.
Gaining commands which were actively involved with the training of their
reservists were in a better position to use those reservists effectively
in a crisis. Horizontal integration which is limited to training on the
same equipment does not promote an active partnership. As noted above,
the attitude toward the reserves has evolved from the expectation that
they would be primarily an augmentation force to the expectation of a
force—in-being. If reserves are to be used in short—fuse contingencies
in the future, the working relationships will need to be cultivated
during peacetime
.
There are several possible means of promoting this
relationship. In an era of shrinking manpower resources, gaining
commands need to be made aware of the mutual support aspects of an
active partnership with their reserve units . Particularly during the
transition to a smaller force, reserve assets represent a tremendous
source of additional manpower to meet mission requirements. The reserve
personnel would derive substantial training benefits from sharing the
peacetime operational requirements of their gaining commands.
Gaining commands could also become more involved in certifying
the training readiness of their reserve units and evaluating the
personnel, particularly the CO. At present, though reservists have
requirements for completing active duty for training with their gaining
commands periodically, there are no mechanisms for continuing evaluation
of the reserve unit by the gaining command. Requiring gaining command
COs to certify the training readiness of their reserve units and to
evaluate the CO during the normal evaluation period, perhaps on an
Additional Duty (ADDU) basis, would provide these mechanisms.
A major lesson of Desert Shield/Desert Storm is that all
elements of the total force are needed in a crisis. Therefore, the
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The recall process for Desert Shield/Desert Storm was successful in
two ways: (1) the mission was accomplished. (2) it provided an
object lesson in areas which need attention in order to enhance the
future performance of the Total Force Plan.
A. RECALL VS. MOBILIZATION
Reserve assets can be used under conditions short of full
mobilization. The planning and system development which take place in
the wake of Desert Shield/Desert Storm must recognize and accommodate
this reality. A system of graduated personnel conditions (PERSCONS)
,
linked to contingency planning and supported by fully—developed
implementation plans would have greatly facilitated the recent recall.
This would require increasing the flexibility of the NAMMOS system to
accommodate both recall and mobilization. Billets should be validated
not only for various scenarios but for different PERSCON options . A
comparison of current NAMMOS-validated billets with the actual
requirements during Desert Shield/Desert Storm should provide some
insight into future allocation of reserve personnel assets.
B. SYSTEMIC SUPPORT
The incompatibility of the various personnel information systems in
use was a major source of delay and error during the recall. The recall
was implemented under very labor-intensive conditions, often in spite
of, rather than because of, the existing support systems. The systems in
place were developed individually, each to meet a different set of
requirements, and primarily those requirements which predominate under
peacetime conditions. However, the purpose of the Navy is not to plan
for peacetime conditions. Compatibility of systems is essential if the
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Total Force Plan is to be adapted to constantly changing conditions and
requirements
.
The assumptions which were widely held in the Navy about
accessibility of reserve personnel under conditions other than full
mobilization may have influenced the way systems were developed. These
assumptions are now being re—examined, in light of the Desert
Shield/Desert Storm experience . Since some other services held
different assumptions, their programs may offer some value to the Navy
in the realignment of personnel information systems
.
The actual experiences of Navy reservists during Desert
Shield/Desert Storm may have an impact on future manpower availability,
particularly in the area of continuation rates. This should be closely
scrutinized.
C. HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION
Publications which addressed the Total Force Plan' s evolution in
the Navy prior to Desert Shield/Desert Storm emphasized the necessity of
horizontal integration between active and reserve components. Resource
allocation during recent years, particularly in the area of equipment
procurement, has proven that the commitment to horizontal integration is
real. However, the partnership aspects of horizontal integration need
to be increased. Gaining commands need to regard their augmentation
units as an integral part of the command's total assets. Commanding
Officers have as much of a vested interest in the performance of their
reserve units as in the active duty and civilian full—time employees who
are part of their command' s on a daily basis . Consequently, gaining
command COs need to be actively involved in the training, certification,




Based on the foregoing analysis and conclusions, the following
recommendations are proposed:
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- Develop flexible operational plans, tailored to meet the needs of
varying scenarios, with an accompanying system of graduated personnel
conditions and implementation plans
.
- Increase the flexibility of the NAMMOS system to accommodate
individual recall as well as unit mobilization.
- Compare NAMMOS-validated billets with actual contingency
requirements to identify areas of shortfall or excess.
- Develop an integrated personnel information system which
accommodates active and reserve personnel and vertical and horizontal
information requirements.
- Increase interoperability and integration between SELRES units
and their gaining commands, to ensure appropriate identification of
manpower requirements and certification of training readiness.
— Task gaining commands to certify training readiness of their
SELRES augmentation units.
— Develop an ADDU system in which reserve unit COs are evaluated
by their gaining command CO on an ongoing basis
.
— Ensure that the gaining command CO' s evaluation of reserve the
unit Commanding Officer is considered equally with reserve chain of
command fitness reports.
That the Desert Shield/Desert Storm recall was implemented at all
is a tribute to the historical capacity of Navy personnel to get the job
done regardless of the obstacles faced. One of the most sobering
aspects of this analysis is the fact that two of the major areas of
concern which surfaced during Desert Shield/Desert Storm—systemic
incompatibility and plans which focused on mobilization and excluded
recall—were identified 23 years ago as lessons learned. This indicates
that identifying what went wrong is insufficient grounds to say a lesson
has been learned. Only when the requisite changes are made in current
systems can the lesson truly be said to have been learned.
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Implementing changes to solve the problems which surfaced during
Desert Shield/Desert Storm will not be without cost . Realigning the
personnel information systems, for example, will require a large
expenditure. In fiscally austere times, these changes may be difficult
to make. However, the cost involved needs to be balanced against the
cost savings apparent in moving assets to the reserves and the cost of
maintaining the reserve forces . The expenditures required appeared far
less significant when the benefit of a fully—ready reserve force, easily
accessible when required, is added to the equation.
Whenever the next reserve augmentation is required, whether it
happens in months or whether another 23 years passes, there will be new
lessons to be learned. Hopefully, the lessons which have been learned




This appendix contains the COMNAVRESFOR memorandum which spelled
out the policy and procedures for the recall to active duty for Desert
Shield/Desert Storm. It supplements the information contained in
chapter III.
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MEMORANDUM FOR ALL NAVRESFOR ACTIVITIES
From: COMNAVRESFOR Code 223
Subj : ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR VOLUNTARY/
INVOLUNTARY RECALL TO ACTIVE DUTY (UPDATE NUMBER ONE)
Ref: (a) COMNAVRESFOR NEW ORLEANS LA 2210002 AUG 90
Encl: (1) General Overview and Policy for Voluntary/Involuntary
Recall to Active Duty
(2) Administrative Processing Procedures for Voluntary/
Involuntary Recall to Active Duty
(3) Ultimate PSD maintaining Personal Financial Record
and Service Record
(4) Skeleton Service Record
(5) Active Duty Order Format
(6) Guide for Preparing Active Duty Orders
(7) SDS Worksheet
(8) Other Considerations
1. Reference (a) directs Naval Reserve Activities to download and
use enclosures (1) through (8)/ as required, for the voluntary and
involuntary recall of SELRES personnel to active duty.
2. Per CNO (OP-01) direction, administrative procedures in
enclosures (1) through (8) must be followed to ensure prompt,
efficient gains are applied, members are paid on time, and
dependents receive appropriate entitlements.
3. Terms and acronyms used in enclosures (1) through (8) are
defined as follows:
Co-located Site PSD maintains SELRES record
DDS Direct Deposit System
EOS Expiration of Service
GSS Geographically Separated Site
INCONUS within Continental United States
MGIB Montgomery GI Bill: entitlements earned on
active duty.
MGIB-R Montgomery GI Bill - Reserve; entitlements
earned as SELRES
NRA Naval Reserve Activity
OBLISERV Obligated Service
OUTCONUS outside Continental United States
PFR Personal Financial Record (pay record)
PSD Personnel Support Detachment
RTSS(TE) Reserve Training Support System
(Technical Enhancement)
Servicing PSD PSD processing initial gain to SDS and
opens PFR
SDS Source Data Systems
Ultimate PSD.... PSD designated to maintain PFR and
Service Record after recall
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4. We will continue to keep you informed of revised processing
procedures and provide updates as circumstances dictate. Continue
to liaise with your servicing PSD to ensure all players are aware of
current procedures.
5. POC concerning use of administrative recall procedures is
COMNAVRESFOR (Code 27) at (504) 948-1247 or AUTOVON 363-1247.
PNCM Reed sends
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GENERAL OVERVIEW AND POLICY FOR VOLUNTARY/INVOLUNTARY RECALL TO
ACTIVE DUTY (UPDATE NUMBER ONE)
1. Recalled member reports to NRA for in-processing. Member
remains at NRA (if GSS) or reports to PSD (if co-located) for
processing to active duty.
2. Member completes processing paperwork per enclosure (2).
Enclosure (3) provides ultimate disposition of member's PFR and
serv ice record
.
3. Members ordered to a shore activity INCONUS or Hawaii will pick
up tickets, service record, health and dental record, training
record and PFR and travels to ultimate duty station. PSD servicing
the ultimate duty station (INCONUS) will receive member in SDS and
maintain service record and PFR, (See enclosure (3).
5
.
Under no circumstances will PFRs and service records for SELRES
personnel leave CONUS .
6. Ultimate PSDs will keep PFRs and service records for SELRES
personnel separate from active duty personnel PFRs and service
records and, if possible, dedicate a DK/YN/PN team at that PSD for
records maintenance and liaison.
7. Ultimate PSDs will input entitlement data for personnel ordered
to shore activities INCONUS or Hawaii (paragraph 3) via SDS in the
normal manner. Payment will be made either through DDS or by check
by the PSD holding the member's PFR.
9. PSDs will make emergency payments to SELRES per PAYPERSMAN
(paragraph 40310) and SDSPROMAN (paragraph B50209)
.
10. PSDs maintaining the service record and PFR will process member
for release from active duty.
Enclosure (1)
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Administrative Processing Procedures for the Voluntary/Involuntary
Recall of SELRES Personnel to Active Duty (Update #1)
1. Every reservist ordered to either voluntary or involuntary
active duty will be recalled to their parent NRA for in-processing
and processed on active duty by the NRA (for GSS) or supporting PSD
(for co-located sites). NRAs and PSDs will complete the tasks
listed below to process reservists being recalled for Operation
"Desert Shield". The command responsible for performing the action
is listed beside each task. The first command listed applies to
NRAs co-located with a PSD. The second command listed applies to
NRAs geographically separated from PSD (e.g. FSD/NRA: at co-located
sites the PSD performs the action / at geographically separated
sites NRA performs the action).
CO-LOCATED/GSS
a. Disbursing.
(1) Prepare W-4 for Federal Income tax PSD/NRA
Withholding (SDSPR0MAN1, para. B70104 and PAYPERSMAN,
para. 70108)
.
(2) Prepare DD 205B for State Income Tax PSD/NRA
Withholding (SDSPROMAN, para. B70205 and PAYPERSMAN,
para. 70142)
(3) Each reservist will be required to enroll PSD/NRA
in DDS. To start DDS , the reservist must provide PSD
a copy of a deposit slip or a voided check. Obtain
mailing instructions from member for distribution of
checks issued before DDS is effected. Counsel members
who do not have a financial institution for DDS
concerning possible delays in receiving pay. Encourage
members to open an account before recall processing is
complete
.
(4) Advise members with dependents requesting PSD/NRA
DDS enrollment of the dual DDS advisory option
(SDSPROMAN, para. B41013 and PAYPERSMAN, para. 40617).
If elected, obtain duplicate DDS advisory address from
member
.
(5) Servicing PSD opens PFR. PSD/PSD
b. Personnel/Admin.
(1) Prepare active duty orders after
authorization is received per the format provided in
enclosure (5). Use enclosure (6) as a guide for preparing
orders. Supplemental orders and compliance/non-compliance codes
are in BUPERSINST 1001.39.
67 Enclosure (2)
(2) Verify DOS, extend/reenl ist as necessary. PSD/NRA
Personnel refusing to OBLISERV must be referred to
exemption processing if EOS occurs before expiration
of recall.
(3) Endorse recall to active duty orders with NRA/NRA
time and date member reported for active duty.
only to effect dependency changes. (Ref: PAYPERSMAN, Part 9
article 90434 and MILPERSMAN 5030240). Otherwise, PSD will prepare
smooth Page 2 from existing information without these documents
using SDS . Prepare a Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Election, VA
29-8286, if necessary. (Ref: MILPERSMAN 5030300).
(5) Complete NP 1070/605, History of Assignments, PSD/NRA
entry indicating transfer from reserve unit, recall to
active duty, and transfer from NRA. (Ref: MILPERSMAN
5030360)
.
(6) Complete NP 1070/609, Enlisted Performance PSD/NRA
Record, entry indicating recall to active duty.
(Ref: MILPERSMAN 5030360).
7) Prepare a NP 1070/613, Administrative Remarks, PSD/NRA
entry
:
(a) Acknowledging recall to active duty and
duration of recall.
(b) Establishing Sea Duty Counter (Ref:
MILPERSMAN 2620100, SECNAVINST 7220.77 and ENLTRANSMAN, Chap
3, Art 3.10)
.
(8) Make Travel Arrangements/Reservations (BUPERSINST
4650. 14F):
(a) Government Transportation Requests PSD/PSD
(b) Military Transportation Authorization PSD/PSD
(c) Port Call PSD/PSD
(d) Brief on individual travel, etc. (e.g. per PSD/NRA
diem entitlement)
(9) Prepare a Travel or Country Clearance. (Ref: PSD/PSD
OPNAVINST 4650. HE) .
(10) Prepare rough Application for Dependent Identifi- PSD/NRA
cation Cards - DD Form 1172.
(11) Enter DEERS enrollment information in RAPIDS. PSD/PSD
(Ref: OPNAVINST 1750.2).
(12) Verify Service Record - compare against health NRA/NRA
and dental records (Ref: MILPERSMAN 5030120, 1C and IE).
Enclosure (2)
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(a) Obtain training record for inclusion in
package accompanying member to ultimate duty station
(Ref: MILPERSMAN 5010200).
(b) Obtain Risk Factor Screening/Physical
Readiness Test Results, OPNAV 6110/2 and file in
service record (Ref: OPNAVINST 6110. ID).
(c) Obtain dental and health records for
inclusion in package accompanying member to ultimate
duty station. (Ref: MILPERSMAN 5010260).
(13) Prepare NAVPERS 7041/1 Travel Information





(14) Verify member has identification tags. If NRA/NRA
not, make arrangements for issuance, if required.
(Ref: MILPERSMAN 4610150).
(15) Issue Geneva Convention Card to appropriate PSD/NRA
medical and religious personnel. (Ref: MILPERSMAN
46201100) .
(16) Obtain a current DD Form 1435, COMSEC NRA/NRA
Maintenance Training and Experience Record if member
is a Cryptologic Technician (Maintenance). (Ref:
MILPERSMAN 6650200)
.
(17) Interview foreign Nationals to determine the NRA/NRA
accuracy of recorded citizenship data. (Ref: MILPERSMAN
5030450) .
(18) Counsel single parents or military couples with NRA/NRA
dependents (E-6 and below) . Complete current OPNAV Form
1740/1, Department of Navy Dependent Care Certificate for
all single parents and military couples with dependents
and file in service record. (Ref: OPNAVINST 1740.4).
(19) Advise member if receiving MGIB benefits that
collection by the Veterans' Administration (VA) of over-
payments for the current semester is required. Active
duty Master Military Pay Account (MMPA) - SDS event officer
enrollment code is "1" (INELIGIBLE). Enlisted enrollment
code is "N" (NOT ELIGIBLE)
.
PSD/NRA
(20) Complete SDS Worksheet (enclosure (7)) for each
recalled member. Forward SDS Worksheet, service record and
all other required documents to servicing PSD for processing.
NA/NRA
on
(21) Annotate ultimate duty station and ultimate PSD
member's orders, PFR and service record per enclosure (3)
PSD/PSD
(22) Prepare a
on active duty and
B10210)
.
gain event (NP 1070/622) to report member PSD/PSD
NC 3068 9PAYPERSMAN 90427 & SDSPROMAN
Enclosure (2)
69
(23) Prepare skeleton record if member is not assigned PSD/PSD
to shore duty in CONUS or Hawaii. Member will carry and
turn in skeleton service record, health record, dental record
and training record at ultimate duty station. Contents of
the skeleton record are in enclosure (4).
(24). Forward service record and PFR to ultimate PSD/PSD
PSD via fastest means per enclosure (3).
c. Echelon IV RTSS (TE) sites will enter MOB STAT "A M in
RTSS(TE) for recalled members. This information will be
retained in RTSS (TE) for informational purposes only and
will not be passed to IMAPMIS .
d. NRA will:
(1) Annotate Drill Muster Record (NAVPERS 1570/12)
indicating recall and duration and file copy of recall orders
in personal drill folder. (Ref: BUPERSINST 1001.39).
(2) Re the focal point for all dependent inquiries/
dependent support for recalled members (pay, dependent ID cards,
etc
. ) ; and
(3) Liaison with PSD maintaining the member's PFR and
service record as needed.
(4) DO NOT, REPEAT, DO NOT SUBMIT RSTARS LOSS ENTRY




ULTIMATE PSD MAINTAINING PFR AND SERVICE RECORD (UPDATE #1)
(SELRES ONLY)
Member assigned to shore activity INCONUS and Hawaii:
maintained by PSD which normally supports ultimate duty station
******
Member assigned to USN/MSC ships and mobile units homeported
INCONUS:
maintained by the PSD at the homeport of the ship or mobile
unit
******
Member assigned to USN/MSC ships and mobile units homeported
OUTCONUS:
WESTPAC: maintained by PSD Pearl Harbor
EUROPE, MIDEAST: maintained by PSD NAVSTA Norfolk
******
Member assigned to shore activity OUTCONUS & Alaska
PACIFIC, ALASKA: maintained by PSD NAVSTA San Diego
EUROPE: maintained by PSD New London
MIDEAST: maintained by PSD NAVSTA Charleston
Enclosure (3)
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SKELETON SERVICE RECORD (UPDATE #1)





Page 1070/613 (For adverse administrative remarks only)




ACTIVE DUTY ORDER SUPPLEMENTARY ITEMS (TO BE CONSIDERED AN INTEGRAL
PART OF YOUR BASIC ORDERS, NOT REQUIRED WITH COPIES)
1. Read these orders carefully before commencing travel. Contact
the activity that issued the orders if you have any questions.
Necessary corrections or modifications would be authorized by the
order issuing authority before travel is begun.
2. Travel and report in appropriate uniform. You are required to
have in your possession your Armed Forces Identification card (DD
Form 2N-Reserve) and all government clothing previously issued
when reporting to the order issuing activity for transportation to
your ultimate destination.
3. You will be considered in a temporary active duty status during
the time required for travel from your residence to the order
issuing activity designated, and during the time required for
physical examination. In complying with these orders you are
authorized to travel at your own expense, subject to reimbursement
in accordance with current instructions.
4. In the event you fail to qualify physically for active duty, you
will be ordered home and released from temporary active duty.
5. Take NO action to move your dependents and household effects
based on these orders until you have actually reported to a
permanent duty station and movement is authorized in accordance with
current directives.
6. In the event your reporting station is destroyed or you are
otherwise unable to report as ordered, report to the nearest naval
activity for instructions.
7. Bring with you to the order issuing activity copies or extracts
from documents that will be required to update any changes to your
status such as dependents information, marriage certificates, birth
certificate of dependent children, insurance policies in force, or
background information that would not already be contained in your
service record .
8. (Any additional instructions required by the implementing
directive and/or the order issuing activity.)
Enclosure (5)
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ACTIVE DUTY ORDERS (INDIVIDUAL) - OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
1. AUTHORITY: CNO WASHINGTON DC 2 AUG 90 2. SERIAL NUMBER:
3.
4.
FROM: COMMANDING OFFICER, (ACTIVITY NAME)
ACCOUNTING DATE(ENL): NBHO 1701453,2250 * 000022 AV BHO/1/9/5
BHO**
ACCOUNTING DATA (OFF): NSHO 1701453,2250 * 000022 AE SHO/1/l/T
SHO * *
XECode for member paygrade **=Member's 9-digit SSN without
dashes
5. TO: (Rate, Full Name, SSN)
6. By the authority indicated above you are hereby ordered to
report for active military service for a period of 90 days unless
released or extended for a lesser or greater period by competent
authority. Report to the Medical Officer at the place and date
indicated above for physical examination, including flight physical
for aerouaut ically designated officers and aircrewmen. If found
physically qualified, or if no place of examination is designated,
proceed in time to report to the activity listed in block 3 by
(time), (date) for initial processing to active duty.
7. See reverse side or attached list of supplementary items for
compliance
.
8. After initial processing and when directed proceed and report
not later than (time), (date) to: (Commanding Officer, (command to
which ordered) )
.
Ultimate Destination or Intermediate point FFT Ultimate Destination.
This paragraph applies for activation of units whose ultimate
destination is other than the order issuing activity.
9. COPY TO : 10. DATE PREPARED : 11. ISSUING OFFICER :
COMNAVMILPERSCOM (NMPC-313C) , PCSVAD (NAME)
COMNAVRESFOR (CODE 40) , INTERMEDIATE DEST, (RANK) (BRANCH)
NAVACCTFINCEN (CODE 411) , ULTIMATE DEST (TITLE)
12. ORDER MODIFICATIONS/COMPLIANCE/NON COMPLIANCE/EXEMPTION DATA
13. REPORTING ENDORSEMENTS




PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED ARRIVED ^__








GUIDE FOR PREPARING ACTIVE DUTY ORDERS
GUIDANCE: This form order will serve as the template for Active
Duty Orders (Individual) preparation. Note: There are variables you
will have to customize such as blocks #2, #3, #4, #5/5a/5b/5c, 8 and
11.
When the DTG (block #1) is provided, enter the 2 digits after "DC"
and before "2" .
With respect to accounting data, the following codes are provided
for entry in the "*" block to identify the individual's paygrade:
Enlisted Cod ing :
A=E1 B=E2 C=E3 D=E4 (< 2 YEARS SERVICE) E=E4 (> 2 YEARS SERVICE)















-RDMU X-VADM X -ADM
Make sure you prepare
or officer. You can
selecting a name such










of accounting data— for enlisted
duplicating the order itself and
rhen , delete the enlisted line of
fficer accounting data from the
When printing the order
,
you will need to do one test . This
spacing is tight, so make sure you have your printer manually on
"12-pitch" and the typed text begins VISUALL on the second line
below the paper's perforation.
Enclosure (6)
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SDS WORKSHEET (UPDATE #1)
SSN: * NAME:
BR-CL (BRANCH/CLASS *
RATE-ABBR (RATE ABBREVIATION, I.E. ARFAN, PN3) *
RPT-HOUR (REPORT HOUR) *
RPT-DATE (REPORT DATE) *
DET-DATE (DETACHMENT DATE FROM HOME *
UIC-ACTUAL *
SPI (SPECIAL PROGRAM INDICATOR TAR/TEMAC) . (ENL ONLY) A *
UMI (UPWARD MOBILITY INDICATOR) (OFFICERS ONLY)... A_ *
CADD (CURRENT ACTIVE DUTY DATE) *
RADO-MOS (RESERVE ACTIVE DUTY OBLIGATION - MONTHS. *
RADD-DAYS (RESERVE ACTIVE DUTY OBLIGATION-DAYS.... *
VNI-INVOL-RECALL (VOLUNTARY/ INVOLUNTARY RECALL) *
SDCD (STA DUTY COMMENCEMENT DATE) *
SEX *
ACC (ACCOUNTING CATEGORY CODE) 100 _*
RES-CONT-EXT *
ENL-TERM (ENLISTMENT TERM) *
CED (CURRENT ENLISTMENT DATE) *
CITIZEN *
MBR-DOB (MEMBER'S DATE OF BIRTH) *
MEMBER POB (MEMBER'S PLACE OF BIRTH) *
PEBD (PAY ENTRY BASE DATE) *
ADSD (ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE DATE) *




OPEX (OPERATIVE EXTENSION) *
INOPEX (INOPERATIVE EXTENSION) *
ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY FROM *
ORDERS ISSUED BY *
AUTHORITY *
CERTIFY OFF ICER NAME AND GRADE *
DOS (DEPENDENTS ON STATION Cv/ERSEAS) *
ENDORSEMENT NUMBER 01 *
DATE OF ORDERS *
REQUIRED FIELDS




OTHER CONSIDERATIONS (UPDATE #1)
1. Availability of doctor during inoculations/drawing of blood.
2. Availability of correct serum for required inoculations.
3. Drain blood from personnel requiring HIV testing immediately
upon reporting to obtain results as early as possible.
4. Verify health and dental records and make annotation indicating
recall to active duty.
5. Updated Last Will and Testament.
6. Copies of birth certificates for member and all dependents.
7. Social Security Numbers for member and dependents.
8. Certified copies of marriage license or certificate and divorce
decree .
9. Names and addresses of banks, savings and loan associations and
credit unions, with account and safety deposit box numbers, as well
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